AGENTS.md

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Keep infrastructure Dockerfiles under `infra/images/` and local Compose, service
 configuration and shell tooling under `infra/local/`. Keep product source under
 `backend/` and `frontend/`. Organize Vault KV paths by owning service under
 `services/<service>/<purpose>`, infrastructure under `infrastructure/<component>/<purpose>`,
-and bootstrap administration under `bootstrap/<component>`. Caller credentials
+and bootstrap administration under `infrastructure/<component>/bootstrap`. Caller credentials
 belong to the receiving service at `services/<service>/callers/<caller>`.
 Use Caddy for local browser HTTPS and certificate management. Treat the private
 local Docker network as trusted; do not add internal gRPC TLS or Vault-managed

docs/implementation.md

@@ -743,3 +743,11 @@ and 1,083 expected HTTP responses, zero failures. Role TTLs were restored and
 temporary BFF/frontend containers removed. `make up` intentionally stops at the
 missing Resend credential check; no real email, optional security scan or merge
 was performed. Earlier supplementary legacy test limitations remain recorded.
+
+Mongo bootstrap credentials now live at `kv/infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap`,
+consistent with component ownership. The live `kv/bootstrap/mongo` value was
+copied, compared and archived before removing the old path. Bootstrap and admin
+checks read the new path; application identities are denied both paths. Shell
+checks and live infrastructure validation (including Mongo transactions, lease
+renewal/revocation and obsolete-path absence) passed. `make up` still stops at the
+expected missing-Resend check. No backend code or product behavior changed.

docs/local-development.md

@@ -41,10 +41,9 @@ kv/
 │   └── notifications/
 │       ├── callers/bff                 # token; read by BFF and notifications
 │       └── email/resend                # driver, api_key, sender_address, sender_name
-├── infrastructure/
+└── infrastructure/
-│   └── nats/auth                       # token; read by NATS and notifications
+    ├── nats/auth                       # token; read by NATS and notifications
-└── bootstrap/
+    └── mongo/bootstrap                 # local administrator and replica-set bootstrap material
-    └── mongo                           # local administrator and replica-set bootstrap material
 ```
 
 Every secret has an owning service or infrastructure component. Service policies
@@ -130,7 +129,8 @@ still interrupt work. Repository consumers use `source.Source` operation scopes;
 ## Migration and persistence
 
 Bootstrap migrates the old flat `bff`, `caller`, `email` and `nats` paths into the
-hierarchy above. It copies with CAS protection, compares values, and refuses to
+hierarchy above, and moves `bootstrap/mongo` to `infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap`.
+It copies with CAS protection, compares values, and refuses to
 overwrite conflicting destinations. After consumers use the new paths, it removes
 old KV metadata and obsolete `tls`, `frontend-tls`, `notifications-tls` entries.
 Readable old version history and metadata are archived privately in

infra/local/scripts/bootstrap.sh

@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ mounts() {
  fi
 }
 provision_mongo() {
- if [ "$(kv bootstrap/mongo)" = null ]; then
+ if [ "$(kv infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap)" = null ]; then
   random > "$WORK/password"; random 384 > "$WORK/keyfile"; random > "$WORK/manager"
-  jq -n --rawfile password "$WORK/password" --rawfile keyfile "$WORK/keyfile" --rawfile manager "$WORK/manager" '{password:($password|rtrimstr("\n")),keyfile:($keyfile|rtrimstr("\n")),manager_password:($manager|rtrimstr("\n"))}' | put bootstrap/mongo
+  jq -n --rawfile password "$WORK/password" --rawfile keyfile "$WORK/keyfile" --rawfile manager "$WORK/manager" '{password:($password|rtrimstr("\n")),keyfile:($keyfile|rtrimstr("\n")),manager_password:($manager|rtrimstr("\n"))}' | put infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap
  fi
- kv bootstrap/mongo > "$WORK/mongo-secret"
+ kv infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap > "$WORK/mongo-secret"
  jq -r '.password' "$WORK/mongo-secret" | write "$STATE/mongo/password"
  jq -r '.keyfile' "$WORK/mongo-secret" | write "$STATE/mongo/keyfile"
  compose up -d mongo

infra/local/scripts/common.sh

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ ensure() (
 )
 # Never forward mongosh errors: authentication/command errors may include secrets.
 mongo() { compose exec -T mongo mongosh --quiet --file /dev/stdin > "$WORK/mongo-result" 2> "$WORK/mongo-error" || return 1; cat "$WORK/mongo-result"; }
-admin_auth() { kv bootstrap/mongo | jq -r '"const admin=db.getSiblingDB(\"admin\"); admin.auth(\"local-admin\","+(.password|tojson)+");"'; }
+admin_auth() { kv infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap | jq -r '"const admin=db.getSiblingDB(\"admin\"); admin.auth(\"local-admin\","+(.password|tojson)+");"'; }
 email_valid() { jq -e '(.api_key|type=="string") and (.api_key|test("\\S")) and (.sender_address|type=="string") and (.sender_address|test("\\S")) and .sender_address!="notifications@localhost.test"' >/dev/null; }
 export_ca() {
  compose exec -T frontend cat /data/caddy/pki/authorities/local/root.crt | write "$STATE/ca.pem" 644

infra/local/scripts/secrets.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ bff services/bff/jwt
 caller services/notifications/callers/bff
 email services/notifications/email/resend
 nats infrastructure/nats/auth
+bootstrap/mongo infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap
 PATHS
 }
 # Archive readable version history privately before removing an obsolete KV path.

infra/local/scripts/verify.sh

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ policies() (
   directory="$STATE/agents/$service"
   login=$(jq -n --rawfile role "$directory/role-id" --rawfile secret "$directory/secret-id" '{role_id:($role|rtrimstr("\n")),secret_id:($secret|rtrimstr("\n"))}' | vault auth/approle/login POST)
   identity=$(printf '%s' "$login" | jq -er '.auth.client_token')
-  printf '%s' "$login" | jq '{token:.auth.client_token,paths:["kv/data/bootstrap/mongo","sys/init","kv/data/bff","kv/data/caller","kv/data/email","kv/data/nats","kv/data/tls"]}' | vault sys/capabilities POST | jq -e '.data | all(.[]; .==["deny"])' >/dev/null || fail 'Service can access bootstrap credentials'
+  printf '%s' "$login" | jq '{token:.auth.client_token,paths:["kv/data/bootstrap/mongo","kv/data/infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap","sys/init","kv/data/bff","kv/data/caller","kv/data/email","kv/data/nats","kv/data/tls"]}' | vault sys/capabilities POST | jq -e '.data | all(.[]; .==["deny"])' >/dev/null || fail 'Service can access bootstrap credentials'
   VAULT_TOKEN=$(printf '%s' "$login" | jq -er '.auth.client_token')
   printf '{}' | vault auth/token/revoke-self POST >/dev/null
   VAULT_TOKEN=$root_token
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ product() {
  echo 'PASS: six healthy services, frontend and proxied BFF use verified TLS; no email sent'
 }
 layout() {
- for old in bff caller email nats tls frontend-tls notifications-tls; do
+ for old in bootstrap/mongo bff caller email nats tls frontend-tls notifications-tls; do
   [ "$(vault "kv/metadata/$old" GET yes)" = null ] || fail "Obsolete KV entry remains: $old"
  done
- for path in services/bff/jwt services/notifications/callers/bff services/notifications/email/resend infrastructure/nats/auth bootstrap/mongo; do
+ for path in services/bff/jwt services/notifications/callers/bff services/notifications/email/resend infrastructure/nats/auth infrastructure/mongo/bootstrap; do
   vault "kv/metadata/$path" | jq -e '.data.current_version>0' >/dev/null || fail "Missing canonical KV entry: $path"
  done
  echo 'PASS: canonical Vault hierarchy present; obsolete flat and TLS entries absent'