Merge pull request 'Show accepted signup delivery without a second send step' (#63) from email-verification-62 into main

This commit was merged in pull request #63.
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tech committed 2026-10-23 10:31:43 +00:00
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@@ -296,3 +296,66 @@ real token was checked read-only and remains unused and unexpired, with its
account pending verification, ready for the user to reopen the link. PR #61 has
not been merged into remote main; this local deployment does not imply a main
branch merge.
### Accepted signup delivery (#62)
Task [#62](https://git.sendico.io/tech/sxchnge/issues/62), branch
`email-verification-62`, delivered in
[PR #63](https://git.sendico.io/tech/sxchnge/pulls/63). On October 23, signup
returned HTTP 202 and the local
SMTP provider accepted its message with status 250, while the user reported an
internal-error screen immediately after Create account. No subsequent
verification request from that attempt reached the BFF. The precise original
client exception was not captured; an ordinary isolated release reproduction
succeeded. The regression below deliberately injects an unavailable follow-up
send service to cover the post-acceptance failure path without claiming that
injected exception was the original cause.
Backend and preview signup mappers now return a `VerificationDelivery` domain
receipt with the recipient and simulation status. It means that signup accepted
the email-queue operation, not inbox delivery, account activation or a session.
The signup provider exposes it through its operation result. The form captures
the receipt before clearing password controllers, whose change listeners reset
auth state, and passes it as transient router extra. The verification provider
initializes directly in the sent state; mounting the page performs no send.
This replaces the backend adapter's hidden one-use signup cache. Every explicit
resend now invokes its service, including the first one after signup.
Routes without a receipt retain their existing behavior: unverified login may
request an email, a fresh verification page asks for an address, and emailed
links run confirmation. Recipient changes invalidate the displayed claim until
another send succeeds. New receipts replace stale recipients. The route codec
discards the receipt when serializing history, so reloads do not invent a queued
result or retain the address. No token or password is included in the receipt.
The existing email-delivery requested/succeeded signals now follow the accepted
signup receipt inside the instrumented service instead of a synthetic send on
page mount. They stay in the signup journey, occur once for the accepted
operation, and remain intermediate queue-acceptance signals. Resends retain
separate attempts and failures; confirmation remains the terminal outcome.
Simulation and privacy rules are unchanged, including the in-memory analytics
and cross-device correlation limitations above.
Frontend review covered the complete app/auth contribution and preserved the
DTO, mapper, service, domain model, provider and UI boundaries. Regressions cover
accepted signup followed by unavailable resend, explicit retry, normalized
receipt mapping, provider initialization/reset, recipient replacement, transient
history, event correlation and exclusion of form values from analytics. EN/RU
flow tests run at 390px with 1.5x text scaling; existing keyboard, autofill and
accessibility suites also pass. Changed-file Dart format checks, analysis in
`frontend/app` and `frontend/packages/sxchnge_auth`, and `make test-frontend`
(221 tests) pass. The new injected-failure regression failed on the previous
implementation and passes with the receipt handoff. A release-browser fixture
with the same backend adapter and a failing resend service shows Check your
inbox after signup with no send call, then the expected error only after an
explicit resend. It sends no email. Native Safari was not automated.
The frontend image was rebuilt with freshly resolved stable digest pins and
recreated without restarting BFF. The served JavaScript matches the new image
at SHA-256 `0a45ce6f0b4658b1f03d8e39b9e39fd3fbfcf6f1626cb3f17705dce2da130a6c`.
Normal browser-trust HTTPS serves the frontend and API with HTTP 200.
`sh infra/local/tools.sh verify` passes all seven services, Vault/database
checks and authenticated Sendico currency/ledger reads. No new customer email,
activation or payment was submitted for this change, and no security scan was
requested or run. The user's pre-existing browser tab must reload to use the
new bundle; their original Safari exception remains unobserved.